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Abstract—Body Sensor Networks (BSNs) provide continuous 
health monitoring and analysis of physiological parameters. A 
high degree of Quality-of-Service (QoS) for BSN is extremely 
required. Inter-user interference is introduced by the 
simultaneous communication of BSNs congregating in the 
same area. In this paper, a decentralized inter-user 
interference suppression algorithm for BSN, namely DISG, is 
proposed. Each BSN measures the SINR from other BSNs and 
then adaptively selects the suitable channel and transmission 
power. By utilizing non-cooperative game theory and no regret 
learning algorithm, DISG provides an adaptive inter-user 
interference suppression strategy. The correctness and 
effectiveness of DISG is theoretically proved, and the 
experimental results show that DISG can reduce the effect of 
inter-user interference effectively. 
Keywords-Body sensor networks; QoS; inter-user 
interference; game theory; no regret learning algorithm 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With recent advances in intelligent (bio-) medical sensors, 
low-power integrated circuits and the rapid development of 
wireless communication, Body Sensor Networks (BSNs) 
have been applied in remote health monitoring and patient 
care [1] [2] [3]. By outfitting patients with wireless wearable 
or implanted vital sign sensors, detailed real-time data on 
physiological status can be continuously sampled, such as 
ECG, SpO2, blood pressure, etc. Although BSNs share many 
of the same challenges with general wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs), many BSN-specific challenges have emerged. 
BSN needs high degrees of reliability for personal real-
time health monitoring [4], however, BSN has fewer and 
smaller nodes relative to a conventional WSN. Smaller nodes 
imply smaller batteries, creating strict tradeoffs between the 
energy consumption, storage, and communication resources. 
Usually, as wireless sensor network, when users gather in the 
same place and their sensors try to transmit data 
simultaneously, the transmissions of sensors in different 
users will interfere with each other. Inter-user interference 
causes unreliable critical data transmission and high bite 
error rate, hence, the critical data can’t be sent to control 
nodes in time. Consequently, the doctor may give wrong 
diagnosis and the patient may be delayed to cure and even 
die. Moreover, the packet loss results in data retransmission. 
Due to the characteristics of energy-sensitiveness and 
resource-limitedness, numerous data retransmissions 
consume much energy and thus may cause the failure of 
biosensors. Additionally, there is almost no underlying inter-
user interference suppression infrastructure in BSN. Thus, 
providing a decentralized inter-user interference suppression 
algorithm for BSN is becoming urgent. 
In this paper, a decentralized inter-user interference 
suppression algorithm for BSN, namely DISG, is proposed. 
In DISG, each BSN measures the SINR from other BSNs 
and then adaptively selects the suitable channel and 
transmission power to reduce the effect of inter-user 
interference. Through non-cooperative game theory, DISG 
provides an adaptive inter-user interference suppression 
strategy by utilizing the no regret learning algorithm. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
introduces related work. In Section III the application 
scenario of DISG algorithm is given. Section IV gives a 
detailed description of the game theoretic framework in 
DISG. The performance of DISG is evaluated in Section V. 
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The growing interest in BSN and the continual 
emergence of new techniques have inspired some efforts to 
research QoS of BSN. Extensive research has been focusing 
on the interference suppression in WSN. Fasano [5] proposes 
a novel consensus algorithm based on [6] to suppress both 
noise and interference. In [7], the authors propose a cluster-
based WSN MAC protocol CBPMAC/TFC. Wu and Biswas 
[8] present a self-reorganizing slot allocation mechanism for 
TDMA-based MAC in multi-cluster sensor networks. The 
issue of interference in WSN is similar to the problem of 
inter-user interference in BSN. However, there is a 
significant gap between the conventional WSN systems due 
to the characteristics of BSN, especially the mobility of BSN, 
and thus none of these interference suppression approaches 
in WSN can be directly applied in BSN.  
Currently, the reliability research of BSN mainly focuses 
on the reliability of communications in intra-BSN. In [9] [10], 
a novel QoS cross-layer scheduling mechanism based on 
fuzzy-logic rules is proposed. Braem et al. [11] [12] propose 
an active replication algorithm for the reliability of 
communication in multi-hop BSN. In [13], a statistical 
bandwidth strategy, namely BodyQoS, is proposed to 
guarantee reliable data communication. Nonetheless, all of 
them neglect the inter-user interference. Natarajan et al. [14] 
highlights the existence of the inter-user interference effect 
in BSN from the perspective of network architectures, but 
the issue of inter-user interference is not investigated. In [15], 
the authors conduct a preliminary investigation of the impact 
of inter-user interference, and implement an instance with a 
fixed WSN infrastructure to reduce interference between 
users. However, that paper does not conduct a 
comprehensive study of inter-user interference. In addition, 
the fixed WSN infrastructure is only suitable for indoor 
environments. 
Although the existing researches play important roles to 
improve reliability of BSN, the inter-user interference is still 
a challenging issue in BSN. In this paper, a decentralized 
inter-user interference suppression algorithm is demonstrated. 
The major differences between this work and the 
aforementioned researches include the following aspects: 
• Non-cooperative game theory is utilized, thus DISG 
is distributed, non-cooperative and self-organizing. 
In this architecture, each BSN measures the SINR 
from other BSNs and then adaptively selects the 
suitable channel and transmission power without the 
need of the communication with each other. 
• Compared with [15], in DISG, the deployment of the 
fixed WSN infrastructure is not required. Therefore 
the system with DISG is more flexible. Moreover, 
DISG suppresses the inter-user interference not only 
through the channel selection, but also through the 
transmission power adjustment. 
III. SYSTEM MODEL 
In this section, we describe the application scenario of the 
DISG algorithm. The scenario where the BSN is formed by a 
collection of biosensors, control nodes and a base station is 
considered in this paper. Fig.1 shows the system scenario. In 
general, the biosensors are wireless wearable or implanted 
vital sign sensors. It consists of a processor, memory, 
transceiver, sensor and a power unit. Each node is typically 
capable of sensing, processing, storing and transmitting the 
data. Through the base station, sampled data are periodically 
sent to the medical server in hospital by the control node, 
where they are stored for further processing [16]. 
 
Figure 1.  BSN application scenario. 
In the scenario illustrated in Fig.1, the transmissions of 
sensors in different users will interfere with each other, when 
they operate in the same vicinity and communicate 
concurrently. Such inter-user interference will be increased 
in some architecture predisposing some of sensors to 
transmit with high power. Additionally, some extraneous 
interference in the same band can also increase the inter-user 
interference [14]. DISG algorithm reduces the effect of inter-
user interference in the network to guarantee reliability 
performance by modeling the channel selection as a non-
cooperative game to decentralize the inter-user interference 
suppression. In the game, each user measures the SINR from 
other users and then adaptively selects the suitable channel 
and transmission power to suppress the inter-user 
interference by utilizing no regret learning algorithm. 
IV. GAME THEORETIC FRAMEWORK 
A. Inter-user Interference Suppression Game Mode 
In order to reduce the effect of inter-user interference in 
the network, we use the technique of channel selection [15] 
and model the channel selection of users as a non-
cooperative game. In this game, each user is a player and 
denoted by a set { }B , 1,...,ib i M= = , and M  is the number 
of users. Let { }C , 1,...,jc j N= =  represents the set of all 
non-overlapping frequency channels that can be used by the 
users, where N  is the number of the available non-
overlapping channels. The transmission power of ib  is 
[ ]min max,ip p p∈  due to the characteristic of the specific 
physiological sensors. The received power of ib  is expressed 
as i iG p , where 0iG >  is the link gain of ib  and can be 
calculated as follows: 
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where iS  is the attenuation coefficient, id  is the maximum 
distance between the biosensor node and the control node in 
ib . δ  is a constant parameter modeling the shadowing effect. 
Based on [17], the signal to interference plus noise ratio 
(SINR) of ib  on the channel jc  is calculated as follows: 
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where jip  is the transmission power of ib  on channel jc , 
i
kυ  
is the distance between user kb  and user ib , and iη  is the 
background noise power. In the game, each user ib  is selfish 
and only cares about itself to close to the ideal SINR 
threshold 0iγ  to ensure specific QoS requirement at an 
optimal power level on an optimal channel, but whether 
other users meet their QoS requirements is irrelevant. 
Obviously, this framework of the game is suitable for 
solving the problem of the inter-user interference. 
Definition 1 Non-cooperative inter-user interference 
suppression game. The non-cooperative game is represented 
by the following tuple B, Λ, U . 
Λ  is the action space of the system, where 
1Λ=Λ ... ΛM× × . The strategy space of user ib  is defined as 
{ }{ }: { } | 1,...,j ji i i ip j Nσ ρΛ = = ∈ , where we define the 
mixed strategy as { }0,1jiρ ∈ , 
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indicates that ib  selects channel jc , which means in this 
distribution, only the pure strategy jiρ  is assumed to be 
selected with a probability of 1. jip  represents the 
transmission power of ib  on channel jc  and 
min max[ , ]
j
ip p p∈ . 
U  is the utility set of the system, where 1U { ,..., }Mu u= . 
The utility of user ib  is denoted as ( , )i i iu σ σ − , which is a 
function of all users’ actions. Each user selects its own action 
iσ  to minimize the utility function. iσ −  is the action taken 
by users except ib . 
There is a trade-off between SINR and power utilization 
due to the energy-limitedness of biosensor, thus, similar to 
[18] [19], the utility function that considers SINR and power 
trade-offs is expressed as: 
 ( ) ( )20, , 1j j ji i i i i i i i iu pσ σ τ γ γ ξ ρ− = − + = . (3) 
where iτ  and iξ  are non-negative weighting factors. 
Different levels of emphasis on SINR and power are 
obtained by adjusting the weighting factors. Based on the 
equation (2), we can get: 
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In the game, the goal of user ib  is to attain high SINR 
and minimize power utilization over the channel that it 
chooses. It is worthwhile to note that there is no message 
exchange in the game. The utility distribution of other users 
iσ −  is not available for user ib . However, ib  can get the 
aggregate response ( )ji iI σ − . To perform equation (5), user 
ib  needs to observe the local information { }( ),ji i i jI cσ −Ι = ∀ . Based on the information, the following 
best response is adopted by every user in the system: 
 ( ) arg min ( , ) B
i i
i i i i i iu bσπ σ∈ΛΙ = Ι ∀ ∈ . (5) 
where iπ  represents the strategy for the selection of the 
channel and the transmission power. The solution to the 
problem in equation (5) will lead to a Nash Equilibrium (NE).  
B. Nash Equilibrium in Game 
In order to analyze the outcome of the game, we will give 
how the game is played by rational players using the concept 
of NE, which states that in the equilibrium every player will 
select a utility-minimizing strategy given the strategies of 
other players.  
Definition 2 Nash Equilibrium: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )* ** * * *1 1 2 2 ** ** * 1 1 2 2, ,..., N Nj jj j j j N Np p p pρ ρ ρ ρ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . (6) 
 is defined as: 
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i.e., given other players’ actions, no user can reduce its utility 
alone by changing its own action. 
Theorem 1 For a specific channel jc , with all other 
players’ transmission powers fixed on the channel, user ib  
can get the best transmission power on the channel jc  
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Take the derivative with respect to ijip  and equate it to 
zero for ijip  to be a NE, then we can get: 
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Due to 0ijip ≥ , we can get : 
 ( ) 02i ij j i ii i
i
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For given iτ , iξ , 0iγ , iG  and ijip , let the quadratic 
equation (9) in ( )i ij ji iI p−  have a real solution. Because the 
transmission powers is max
j
ip p≤ , /i iτ ξ  must satisfy: 
 ( )
max
20
2i
i i
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≥ . (11) 
According to [17], in order to make the game converge to 
a unique fixed point, a fixed point from the equation (9) 
should satisfy the properties: 1) positivity; 2) monotonicity; 3) 
scalability. Based on [18], we can get 
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Based on equations (10), (11) and (12), the non-
cooperative game has a unique NE for the transmission 
power *( )ijip  on a certain channel jc  in the condition of 
( )20max2i i ipτ ξ γ≥  and 0( )i ij ji i i i i iI p Gτ γ ξ− < . ■ 
Definition 3 A probability distribution ω  is a correlated 
equilibrium (CE) over the set of user strategies, if and only if, 
the following inequality is satisfied: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )', , , 0
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for all Bib ∈ , and i iρ ∈ Λ  and i iρ− −∈ Λ , and a CE is an 
NE if and only if it is a product measure. 
Theorem 2 Each user ib  converges to a NE to attain the 
best channel *
ij
c  (i.e., 
*
1ijiρ = ) with the no regret learning 
approach. 
Proof: Based on the definition 3, we can find the set of 
correlated equilibrium is nonempty, convex and closed in the 
finite game. Thus, according to [20], when players select 
their strategy randomly, there exists a no-regret strategy such 
that if every player follows such a strategy, then the 
empirical frequencies of play converge to the set of 
correlated equilibrium. In addition, this correlated 
equilibrium is NE, because the correlated equilibrium 
corresponds to the special case in which ( ),i iω ρ ρ−  is a 
product of each player’s probability for different actions, i.e., 
the play of the different players is independent. Thus, based 
on the NE converged, each user can attain the best channel 
by no regret learning approach. ■ 
Theorem 3 Nash Equilibrium exists in the non-
cooperative inter-user interference suppression game. 
Proof: For each player Bib ∈ , it can attain the best 
channel *
ij
c  (i.e., 
*
1jiρ =  ) with the no regret learning 
approach based on the Theorem 2 , and select the best 
transmission power 
*
ij
ip  on the channel *
ij
c  according to 
Theorem 1 to minimize utility. Therefore, there exists a NE 
( ) ( ) ( )* ** * * *1 1 2 2 ** ** * 1 1 2 2, ,..., N Nj jj j j j N Np p p pρ ρ ρ ρ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  in the game.■ 
C. No Regret Learning Strategy 
The no-regret learning algorithm [21] is utilized to get 
the NE in the game. In the game, each user selects its action 
based on the history of actions of every user. User ib  
determines the probability distribution of strategy iσ  based 
on the average regret at iteration period { }1...tϕ ∈ . For two 
distinct strategies ( ),i iϕ ϕσ σ −  and ( )( )( )* ,ji i ip ϕσ σ − , the 
historical cumulative regret of user ib  from ( ),i iϕ ϕσ σ −  to 
( )( )( )* ,ji i ip ϕσ σ −  up to iteration t is: 
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1
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Based on (14), the probability iω of the selection of 
action ( )*ji ipσ of user ib  at iteration t +1 is calculated as 
follows: 
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Each user ib  repeats calculations based on equations 
(14), (15), and then it can determine its strategy at time step 
t +1 as: 
 ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) { }*1 1*1 1 if max
0 otherwise
t j t
i i i it j
i i i
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p
ω σ ωρ σ
+ +
+
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.(16) 
Fig.2 illustrates the learning strategy with no-regret 
learning algorithm. At the initial step, each user ib  randomly 
selects its channel 
ij
c  with equal probability. The optimal 
transmission power ijip  and utility ( ),i i iu σ σ −  on channel 
ij
c  will be calculated. Based on ijip  and ( ),i i iu σ σ − , the 
probability of ib  for the current strategy is got. If there exists 
a channel that has not been selected, then user ib  repeats the 
step of random channel selection with equal probability. 
When the maximum ( )( )*ji i ipω σ  in the probability 
distribution iω  has exceeded the threshold φ , user ib  will 
get the solution ( )* * *i ij ji ipρ , otherwise it will select a channel 
based on the probability distribution iω  and repeats its 
learning process. 
( )* * *i ij ji ipρ
ib
ij
c
( )*ijip
ij
c
( ),i i iu σ σ −
ij
c( )*ijip
( )( )*ji i ipω σ
φ
ij
c
iω
ib
 
Figure 2.  Learning strategy in the game. 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In order to evaluate DISG, we extend the Castalia 
simulator [22] to support the simulation of inter-user 
interference. Castalia is an open source, discrete event-driven 
simulator designed specifically for WSN and BAN based on 
OMNeT++ [23]. 
In the experiment, there exist five BSNs deployed 
randomly in a 10m×10m field, and each BSN simulates a 
typical on-body sensor network, in which sensors measure a 
person’s physiological parameters. Each BSN has a control 
node and three biosensors. All sensor nodes adopt Castalia 
standard CC2420 IEEE802.15.4 radios. Five non-
overlapping frequency channels can be used by each BSN in 
the experiment. Table I describes the detailed simulation 
parameters.  
TABLE I.  SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Parameters Value 
Number of BSNs 5 
Number of sensor types 3 { ECG, SpO2, Temperature } 
Number of non-overlapping 
frequency channels 
5 {11, 12, 13, 14, 15} 
Transmission power set (mW) {29.04, 32.67, 36.3, 42.24, 46.2, 
50.69, 55.18, 57.42} 
Wireless channel model Log shadowing wireless model 
Path loss exponent 2.4 
Collision model Additive interference model 
Physical and MAC layer IEEE 802.15.4 standard 
In the whole experiment, three metrics are used for 
performance evaluation: the transmission power of biosensor 
of each BSN, the channel used by each BSN and the average 
SINR of the system. 
Fig.3 presents the channel selection of each BSN with 
DISG. At the beginning of the experiment, all BSNs select 
their channels randomly with equal probability. Then they 
select channels based on the probability distribution got by 
the no regret learning. At last, the experiment converges to 
the point where all BSNs operate on different frequency 
channels to reduce the inter-user interference effect. 
 
Figure 3.  Channel selection of each BSN with DISG. 
The transmission power selection of each BSN with 
DISG is presented in Fig.4. We can find that each BSN 
selects the suitable transmission power at each iteration to 
get the lowest utility, and then calculates the regret to get the 
probability distribution of the action. When the channel 
selections of all BSNs converge, each BSN will select the 
suitable transmission power over the optimal channel. 
 
Figure 4.  Transmission power selection of each BSN with DISG. 
As can be seen from Fig.5, the average SINR of all BSNs 
in the system with DISG is obviously higher than the system 
without DISG in the entire experimental process. In the 
phase of channel random selection with equal probability, 
DISG considers the trade-off between SINR and power 
utilization, thus the average SINR is higher owing to the 
adaptive selection of transmission power. In addition, the no 
regret learning can further improve the average SINR by the 
channel selection based on the probability distribution. At 
the end of the experiment, the average SINR of the system 
with DISG is almost 90dB and relatively stable compared 
with the system without operating DISG. Therefore, DISG 
can reduce the inter-user interference effectively. 
 
Figure 5.  Average SINR of the system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a decentralized inter-user interference 
suppression algorithm with non-cooperative game for BSN 
(DISG) has been presented. DISG can effectively reduce the 
inter-user interference effect by utilizing no regret learning 
algorithm. We theoretically prove the correctness and 
effectiveness of DISG. Simulation results show that DISG 
achieves high performance. The primary contributions of this 
paper are summarized as follows: 
(1) A non-cooperative game theoretic framework is 
adopted, in which the control node of each user measures the 
SINR from other users and then adaptively selects the best 
channel and transmission power to suppress the inter-user 
interference. 
(2) The trade-off between SINR and power utilization is 
considered in the inter-user interference suppression game. 
(3) Compared with the existing infrastructure-based 
inter-user interference suppression solution, the deployment 
of the fixed WSN infrastructure is not required in DISG. 
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